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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of \ 
JAMES JOHN LATSIS (sometimes! Case No. 7954 
known as "Latses"), Deceased. ) 
STATEMENT 
A short reply brief by respondents is required be-
cause new matters are presented in appellants-' answer 
brief; and, since there are no pleadings defining the 
issues here is a larg'e and involved probate record, more 
confusion may arise. 
Appellant's answer brief takes some scattered 
shots at a few matters considered answerable, but it 
ignores most of the fundamental matters raised by 
the petitioners and by Amici Curiae. New matters are 
argued without any reference to the order of the Court 
appealed from, or to the grounds of our motion upon 
which the Court's order was based. 
We will follow their points I and I I in the order 
presented. 
1 
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ABGUMENT 
L 
The equivocal claim is now made that the decree of 
October 9, 1945, is "either conditional or void as to 
its distributive clause." 
This goes beyond what the opinion of this Court 
said, and is a different point from any heretofore pre-
sented. This Court's opinion said the "decree of dis-
tribution and order of discharge # # * was conditional 
# # m^y rp^g
 w a g ] 3 e c a u s e 0f a misunderstaning as to 
the decree. The appellants, as pointed out in Mrs. 
Latsis' petition (p. 8) had, in fact, complained in their 
brief because the final decree did not adopt the conditions 
which they claimed were in the stipulation and which 
this Court's opinion said the final decree did adopt. 
And while the Court's opinion did in effect destroy the 
decree, it did not say, nor was this done, on the theory 
that it was void because of anything within itself or in 
the probate record here, or at all. So that if this theory 
were now adopted, it would seemingly require a rehear-
ing and argument on the point of voidness. 
True, the appellants also made a statement in their 
former brief which they now (p. 7) refer to and quote 
and which statement is exactly contrary to their con-
tention above referred to. This quote (p. 7) contains two 
false statements by which this Court was misled. It 
does, however, mention a sort of qualified "nullity." 
Their petitions and assignments didn't present, and 
their brief didn't argue the point now argued, nor can 
2 
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judgments be vacated on off-hand assertions of disputed 
facts made in a brief. Anyway, this reference is the 
only basis claimed for bringing up this point now. 
And then on the assumption that the decree is 
absolutely void, authority is now cited that, " A void 
decree can be * * * attacked at any time.'' The assump-
tion that it is void is supported by no authority, and 
only two things are hinted at for this claim: 
(1) That Section 74-4-5 on " Succession" says 
that under certain conditions the estate must be dis-
tributed to the heirs therein defined unless otherwise 
"provided in this title or in the probate code, * * *." So 
it is assumed that if any decree does not distribute the 
estate or any of it to the heirs entitled hereto, it is void 
and can be vacated by petition at any time. 
The Amici Curiae brief (p. 5-12) cites several Utah 
cases in which decrees of the lower Courts have failed 
to distribute to the heirs entitled under this statute 
and which decrees were nevertheless upheld by this Court 
as not only not void and not subjct to collateral attack, 
but subject only to direct attack within the statutory time 
and for extrinsic fraud. The general rule to this effect is 
also cited there, and other cases and authorities are cited 
(p. 4-6) in the petition of Mrs. Latsis here. While the 
matter was not presented so as to be required to be 
directly and exhaustively briefed, these cases and 
authorities completely refute appellants' claim that this 
decree is void. 
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Appellants mention only one of these cases, Tiller v. 
Norton, 253 P. 2d 618. There the decree gave nothing to 
two direct heirs, while here the degree gave these collater-
al heirs what the trial Court determined to be their share 
of the estate. Appellants attempt to distinguish this 
case by merely saying " there is no analogy between the 
Tiller case and this case. Here the Court lacks the power 
to vary from the statutory rule of distribution and any 
such variance constitutes a void judgment." If this 
judgment is void because of variance from this statute, 
then this Court has been wrong in all these prior decisions 
cited, where there has been plain variance. This ipsedixi-
tism is an easy, if somewhat arbitrary, disposal by appel-
lants of the Tiller case and these other cases and authori-
ties all holding' contrary to this statement. 
Since the second hint of a basis of claim that the 
decree is void refers to the attorney appointment under 
75-14-25, we will discuss this under their point II. 
II . 
This hint at voidness is supported (p. 6) by a quota-
tion from one of their petitions. This is under the asser-
tion that the "power and authority" for Mr. Cotro-Manes 
to act on behalf of these heirs was challenged in the 
petition. Nothing in the quotation does challenge this 
however. The petition filed more than seven years after 
probate was commenced merely makes these three incor-
rect assertions of fact: 
4 
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(a) That appellants were unaware of the pendency 
of these probate proceedings. 
(b) That they were not advised of such by their 
attorney. 
(c) That he did not consult with them concerning 
affairs of the estate. 
On these inrelevcmt statements and the reference 
(p. 4) to the fact that the decree refers to his appointment 
and mentions the allowance of his fee and the amount to 
be distributed to the heirs, it is claimed the decree is 
void. 
So, the contention comes to this: If the Court had 
appointed no representative for these parties at all and 
nothing had been done on their behalf, a final decree 
of distribution which didn't give them what they claim 
they are entitled to might be upheld; but because the 
attorney was appointed and because he failed to advise 
them as above recited, the final decree is void, and the 
Court should now hold it void without proof of these 
assertions. This not only would emasculate the statute 
as to the appointment and representation of minors and 
absent heirs, but would make it a menace to any final 
decree if the trial Court did anything under it at all. 
Point I I repeats that an attorney appointed under 
this section " cannot compromise a claim without con-
sent of the heir." 
In the first place, the attorney did not compromise 
the claim, and this term has been repeatedly and wrong-
5 
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fully used by appellants, and the Court has been misled 
thereby. We have quoted (Banks's petition, p. 8) the 
record which shows that on the hearing it was determined 
that this was not a "compromise" at all, and the trial 
Court made a finding and determination (R. 95) that 
the amount fixed and distributed was the share of these 
heirs. 
In the second place, there is no good reason to be-
lieve, and certainly no authority has been cited, that the 
attorney representing these heirs could not compromise at 
least by agreeing on a division, if the Court approved. 
Their claim is not compromised when all the heirs here, 
including a brother, and the representative of the foreign 
ones, consent to a division found by the Court to be cor-
rect. 
In the third place, the statute plainly gives the 
representative and the Court complete authority to act 
for and bind these heirs in "settlements, partitions and 
distributions of estates." (See appellants' reply brief, 
p. 2-3, for definition of "settlement without any notice.") 
This is the very heart and purpose of this statute, and 
no authority has been cited that they do not have this 
power in this matter, and if they do not, the statute 
is meaningless. 
In the fourth place, if the Court and the attorney 
both erred to appellants damage, it would not affect the 
finality of this decree or make it void, and no authority 
has been cited indicating that it would. The brief of 
Amici Curiae shows this conclusively, and also (p. 13-14) 
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establishes that there can't be asserted as "'conditions" 
something a "party is bound" to do, as are appellants 
here. 
It is asserted that our statute was taken verbatim 
from California. This is not literally true, but as to the 
portions of the statue here involved, the statutes are 
identical. But the statement that this statute has ever 
been construed by the Courts of California in respect to 
the power of dealing with "settlements, partitions and 
distributions" here involved, is completely false. This 
was refuted in the answer brief of respondents at pages 
5 and 6 where it was shown that all these California 
cases related to things entirely foreign to the matters here 
involved. The two cases which it is claimed interpreted 
this statute before Utah enacted it, interpreted nothing 
under consideration here, and nothing that is in our 
statute at all. 
The first case related only to an appointed attorney's 
authority to withdraw a pending action brought to contest 
a will. The second related only to fees of an appointed 
attorney holding that he could recover such, but that he 
claimed too much. 
The Lux case quoted from in the opinion indi-
cates that their statute had then been amended at dif-
ferent times so that there is no indication that this statute 
was in effect when these first two cases were decided. 
This Lux case also related solely to fees, and, in addition 
to holding that a Court appointed attorney could be 
replaced by an attorney of an adult heir's own selection, 
7 
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said that fees were claimed (60 P. at 32) for services 
rendered " almost two years before the appointment was 
made" and that the Court could not fix the amount of fees 
before any services had been rendered or appraised. That 
is all. 
The Court, then apparently incensed at the exorbi-
tant claim of the appointed attorney, who "had already 
received $93,000," said in the dicta quoted in the opinion 
of the Court here that the Court could do nothing 
with this statute that it couldn't do without it, which, 
if so as to fees, is not so as to the authority conferred by 
the statute; but even in the speculative illustrations there 
made, and here quoted, the authority expressly given by 
our statute and exercised, is not referred to. I t was 
said that the Court couldn 't give the appointed attorney 
authority i i to bind a person who is sui juris to waive his 
rights, or concede claims against him, or to institute 
proceedings for him or to incur costs chargeable to him." 
Here, the Court didn't do, and the attorney didn't 
attempt to do, any of these. There is in fact no justi-
fication for giving this Lux case the unwarranted appli-
cation given it, or any application, to the case at bar. 
We can't get away from the fact that the Court 
determined what appellants' rights were here; nobody 
waived them. The objection is to the correctness of that 
determination and distribution, for if they received their 
share they can't complain, and even if both the attorney 
and the Court had erred as to that determination, this 
8 
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final judgment would certainly not thereby be rendered 
void. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
MOSS & HYDE, 
Attorneys for Petitioner, 
Virginia Latsis Zambukos 
MULLINEK, PEINCE & 
MULLINER, 
Attorneys for Petitioner, 
Utah Savings & Trust Company 
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